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From marginal relevance, the trade and business relations between Australia and Latin 
America have grown during the past two decades. A proximate reason is that they 
diversified to encompass a greater range of manufactures and services. Differences in the 
business environments of Australia and Latin America remain that are obstacles to further 
expansion of these relations. The ultimate reason for the growth and diversification of 
these relations is that Australia and its key business partners in Latin America (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico) experienced the impact of processes of trade liberalisation, 
market deregulation and structural reform during the past two decades. Australia and 
these Latin American countries now share common interests in fostering business 
relations, for which there are opportunities at multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral levels.  
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Forty years ago, Australian historian Glen Barclay (1969) concluded that Australia and 
Latin America were ‘strangers in the hemisphere’, as their political and business relations 
had been and continued to be truly marginal.
1 Despite being situated in the Pacific Rim – 
the most dynamic part of the global economy – trade and investment flows remained 
relatively marginal for another 20 years. The main reason was a lack of economic 
complementarity, as Australia and key Latin American countries were competitive 
exporters of primary products. They still are, but this paper will demonstrate that trade 
and investment flows between both continents have grown significantly in recent years, 
before explaining why this was the case. 
Section 2 establishes the orders of magnitude of change in the business relations. 
It demonstrates that the inter-continental trade flows have grown and diversified away 
from basic commodities. Section 3 examines remaining differences in the business 
environments of Australia and the countries of Latin America that may help to explain 
why Australia’s business relationships across the Pacific still hold a lot of promise.  
Section 4 argues that several preconditions for the growth of Australia’s business 
relations with Latin America were a result of the fundamental processes of trade 
liberalisation, market de-regulation and structural reform since the 1980s. These 
economic and trade policy reforms have greatly expanded the range of interests that 
Australia and the countries of Latin America share in the international trade policy which 
also enhances the scope for closer business relations.  
  Section 5 of this paper examines the scope to realise the remaining opportunities 
for building a closer trade and business partnership between Australia and Latin 
American countries. It probes the increased scope for pursuing shared trade policy 
objectives in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as the opportunities for closer 
cooperation through new and important regional, plurilateral and bilateral initiatives. 
  
2. Recent trends: An expanding relationship 
 
Trends in bilateral business relations between Latin America and Australia may be 
captured with statistics on trade and investment. Table 1 shows 5-year averages in order 
to abstract from year-to-year fluctuations. The balance of goods trade has shifted in 
favour of Latin America during the past 10 years, as Australia’s imports exceed exports. 
The balance of services trade has shifted in Australia’s favour over the last 5 years, but 
the margin is small. The table also shows that the trade relations grew significantly by a 
factor of four in the case of goods during the past 20 years. This rate of growth exceeded 
that of Australia’s trade with the rest of the world, and Latin America’s share in 
Australia’s exports and imports increased to respectively 1.5% and 1.8%. During the past 
10 years, Australia’s services exports to Latin America increased by a factor of 2.5, 
higher than goods exports that increased by a factor of 1.7. This indicates that Australia’s 
business relations with Latin America are accommodating services to a greater degree. 
                                                 
1 Latin America is broadly defined to comprise South and Central America, including the Caribbean. 
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Nevertheless, shares of 2% or less in Table 1 indicates that Latin America is in relative 
terms still of lesser importance to Australia’s foreign trade relations than other parts of 
the world, particularly the European Union, East Asia and North America.  
 
 
Table 1: Australia - Latin America Trade Relations, 1990-2009 (annual averages) 
  Australian Exports to Latin America    Australian Imports from Latin America 
  Goods   Services    Goods  Services 
   (mln A$) 
% of 
total     (mln A$) 
% of 
total     (mln A$) 
% of 
total     (mln A$) 
% of 
total 
1990-94  655 1.1%    na  -   829 1.5%   na  - 
1995-99  1,060 1.3%    na  -   1,061 1.2%   na  - 
2000-04  1,473 1.3%    365 1.0%   1,732 1.4%   472 1.4% 
2005-09  2,607  1.5%     928  2.0%     3,344  1.8%     743  1.5% 
Note: na = not available. 
Sources: Calculated from ABS 5368.0 and ABS 5368.055.004.  
 
 
  Table 2 shows that 80 to 85% of Australia’s trade with Latin America is with 
Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina. These are the continent’s three most populous 
countries, while Chile is geographically closest to Australia and also has the most open 
economy. Puerto Rico has a role in Australia’s imports from Latin America, largely due 
to the imports of products from that country’s prominent pharmaceutical industry.  
 
 
Table 2: Australia’s Main Trade Partners in Latin America, 2005-09 (annual averages) 
  Australia’s Goods Exports       Australia’s Goods Imports 
   (mln A$)  % of total        (mln A$)  % of total 
Brazil 1,021  39.2%    Mexico  1,119  33.5% 
Mexico 771  29.6%    Brazil  873  26.1% 
Chile 236  9.1%    Chile  387  11.6% 
Argentina 188  7.2%    Puerto  Rico  387  11.6% 
Peru 92  3.5%    Argentina  273  8.2% 
Colombia 36  1.4%    Peru  99  3.0% 
Trinidad & Tobago   31  1.2%    Costa Rica  69  2.1% 
Costa Rica  30  1.2%    Colombia  28  0.8% 
El Salvador  26  1.0%    Dominican Rep.  19  0.6% 
Jamaica 25  1.0%    Uruguay  17  0.5% 
Guatemala 25  1.0%    Ecuador  12  0.4% 
Other 126  4.8%    Other  61  1.8% 
Total 2,607  100%      Total  3,344  100% 
Source: Calculated from ABS 5368.0.  
 
 Table 3: Shares of Product Groups in Australia’s Goods Trade with Latin America, 2005-09 annual averages  
    Australia’s exports to    Australia’s imports from 
SITC Rev.3 category 
Argen-




rage    
Argen-





0  Food  and  live  animals  0.4% 0.6% 7.3% 9.9% 4.6%   36.9%  20.3% 9.1% 1.7%  17.0% 
1  Beverages  and  tobacco  0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1%    0.9% 3.1% 1.1% 6.1% 2.8% 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  23.1%  0.8%  1.9%  6.3%  8.0%    4.4%  10.4%  22.8%  0.4%  9.5% 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  57.6%  77.9%  47.3%  43.4%  56.6%    0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes  0.0%  0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%   12.8% 1.2% 0.1% 0.0% 3.5% 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.  5.8%  5.7% 6.8% 5.5% 5.9%    9.3% 5.8% 6.1% 5.6% 6.7% 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material  1.5%  5.0%  7.7%  7.0%  5.3%    15.3%  16.8%  57.7%  8.7%  24.6% 
7 Machinery  and  transport  equipment  9.3%  7.2% 22.4% 21.4% 15.1%   18.3% 36.8%  2.7% 64.2% 30.5% 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles  2.2%  2.2%  6.4% 2.6% 3.4%    1.8% 4.5% 0.4%  13.0% 4.9% 
  Other and confidential items  0.0%  0.1%  0.0%  2.4% 0.6%    0.4% 1.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 
  Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%    100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
                    
    Total  value  (mln  US$)  151 819 188 609  1,767      220 697 315 898  2,130 
Notes: Australia’ export data include unidentified ‘confidential items’ and shares in Australia’s exports are therefore based on partner country trade 
data. The averages are unweighted. 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database, http://comtrade.un.org. 
 
 
  3Table 3 reveals that primary commodities (categories 0-3) dominate Australia’s 
exports to Latin America, followed by a diverse range of machinery and mechanical 
appliances (category 7). Coal (category 3) features prominently in Australia’s exports, 
even though all four Latin American countries are themselves coal producers. Australia’s 
imports from Latin America are dominated by machinery and mechanical appliances, 
particularly in the case with Mexico.
2 A closer look reveals that this largely comprises 
internal combustion engines, car parts and cars, as well as personal computers, computer 
peripherals and communication equipment. The share of Brazil’s exports of manufactured 
products to Australia is also high, particularly for transport equipment, due to the delivery 
of 20 Embrear aeroplanes to Virgin Blue in 2008. Australia also imports basic 
manufactured products from Latin America, particularly refined copper and copper 
products in the case of Chile (categories 2 and 6), as well as assorted food products 
(category 0). 
Table 4 shows that on average the share of manufactures in Australia’s imports 
rose from 56% in 1990-94 to 67% in 2005-09. The average share of manufactured 
products in Australia’s exports increased marginally from 26 to 30%. Table 4 therefore 
reveals that manufactured products now play a greater role in Australia’s trade with Latin 
America than 20 years ago. Australia’s goods trade with Latin America has clearly 
diversified away from primary commodities. 
 
 
Table 4: Share of Manufactures in Australia’s Goods Trade with Latin America, 1990-94 and 2005-09 
annual averages 
   Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Average 
A. Australia’s Exports           
1990-94 48.0%  8.0%  34.6%  14.8%  26.4% 
2005-09 18.8%  20.1%  43.4%  36.4%  29.7% 
B. Australia’s Imports           
1990-94 45.3%  75.9%  22.8%  80.1%  56.0% 
2005-09 44.6%  63.8%  66.8%  91.5%  66.7% 
Notes: Manufactures are defined as SITC Rev.3 categories 5-8. Australia’s export shares for 2005-09 are 
based on partner country trade data (see Table 3). The averages are unweighted. 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database, http://comtrade.un.org. 
 
Australia’s services exports to Latin America consist largely of travel-related 
services, particularly personal travel (tourism) and education-related services, which 
occupy 66%, as Table 5 shows. Vice versa, Australia’s imports of services from Latin 
America are clearly dominated by unspecified business services, followed by tourism and 
transport. The source is too incomplete to allow specific disaggregation of services trade 
by countries of direction and origin. Except that over two-thirds of the large share of 
unspecified imported business services relates are imported from Central America and the 
Caribbean. It is likely that this is related to the significant portfolio and direct investment 
transactions between Australia and countries like the British Virgin Islands (see below).  
  Regarding services related to personal travel, short-term arrivals and departures 
between Australia and Latin America increased considerably. The share of citizens of 
                                                 
2 Australian trade with Mexico may be understated by transit trade via the USA (JEG 2009: 49-50). 
  4Latin American countries on short-term visits to Australia doubled from 0.5% of total 
visitors during 1991-94 to 1.0% during 2004-09, while the share of Australian residents 
visiting Latin American countries increased from 0.8% to 1.2% (calculated from ABS 
3401.0). Such intercontinental visits are still marginal compared to visits between 
Australia and other continents, but they grew to the extent that Australia in 2009 hosted 
67,000 short-term visitors from Latin America, particularly from Brazil, while 86,000 
Australian residents visited Latin America, particularly Brazil, Argentina and Chile.  
 
 
Table 5: Shares in Australia's Services Trade with Latin America, 2005-09 (annual averages) 
  Australia’s Services Exports     Australia’s Services Imports
   (mln A$)  % of total      (mln A$)  % of total
Travel,  personal  331 35.7%  Business,  n.e.s.  346 46.6%
Travel, education  282  30.4%  Travel, personal  166  22.3%
Business,  n.e.s.  127 13.7%  Transport  117 15.7%
Transport  58 6.3%  Travel,  other  48 6.5%
Travel,  other  53 5.7%  Government  22 3.0%
ICT  29 3.1%  Intellectual  property  21 2.8%
Financial  24 2.6%  Travel,  education  10 1.3%
Intellectual  property  6 0.6%  Financial  3 0.4%
Government  5 0.5%  ICT  8 1.1%
Construction  1 0.1%  Insurance,  pensions  1 0.1%
Other  12 1.3%  Cultural,  recreational 1 0.1%
Total  928 100.0%    Total  743 100.0%
Note: ICT refers to Information, Computer and Telecommunications services. 
Source: Calculated from ABS 5368.055.004. 
 
 
  Table 6 shows the stock of Australian investment in Latin America and of 
investments from Latin America in Australia, as far as can be estimated.
3 From an 
Australian perspective, the accumulated investment flows to and from Latin America are 
small, as only 4% of Australian outward investment found its way to Latin America, 
which was the source of only 2% of foreign investment in Australia.  
If it wasn’t for the considerable amount of investment channelled through 
financial institutions and holding companies in Caribbean countries, FDI would have 
been smaller. The ultimate destinations of Australian investment were not other countries 
in Latin America, while Latin America was not the source of this investment in Australia. 
For example, in 2006 Telstra acquired 51% of SouFun Holdings for US$254 million, 
which is a Chinese company registered in the Cayman Islands.
4 Likewise, in 2008 
CopperCo acquired 74% in Mineral Securities for $536 million, a British company 
registered in the Virgin Islands. Vice versa, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings in 
Bermuda acquired 51% of Powercorp Australia in 2000 and 51% of CitiPower in 2002, 
on behalf of Cheung Kong Infrastructure and Hong Kong Electric Holdings, two 
companies in the Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong business group.  
                                                 
3 The ABS does not publish details of investments for most Latin American countries for reasons of 
confidentiality, while the published data for Latin American countries in Table 7 are incomplete. 
4 Telstra divested its interest in SouFun Holdings for US$433 million in September 2010.  
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Table 6: Stock of Investment between Australia and Latin America, 2009 (mln A$)  
  Australian foreign investment    Foreign investment in Australia 
   Direct  Portfolio  Total     Direct  Portfolio  Total 
Argentina  550 88  638   10 240 250 
Bermuda  4,572 5,020 9,592   4,041 2,515 6,556 
Brazil  1,000
*  2,783 3,783   1,586 100  1,686 
British Virgin Islands  825 800  1,625   13,000 7,000  20,000 
Cayman  Islands  1,538 5,303 6,841   1,250 594  1,844 
Chile  1,200 636  1,836   na na na 
Mexico  1,949 1,103 3,052    1  39  40 
Total, these countries  11,634  15,733 27,367   19,888 10,488 30,376 
            
As  %  of  Australia  total 3.4% 3.7% 3.5%   4.6% 1.0% 2.0% 
* The source lists a stock of Australian outward FDI in Brazil of about A$15.9 billion, compared with 
A$1 billion in 2008, and around A$1 billion in the Brazilian statistics (BCB 2010). The flow of Australian 
FDI does not reveal such a significant increase to Brazil in 2009. The increase is therefore likely to be 
caused by changes in the FDI portfolio of Australian firms that brought interests in other countries under 
the control of their subsidiaries in Brazil.   
Notes: na = not available. Numbers in italics are estimates. Total is for identified partner countries only. 
Source: Estimated from ABS 5352.0 
 
 
  Two Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) publications confirm that Table 6 does 
not fully represent investment relations between Australia and Latin America. ABS 
(2004a) reveals that there was an insignificant presence of Latin American companies in 
Australia in 2000-01. This may have changed somewhat, but not drastically. Many Latin 
American firms have internationalised their operations to become the so-called 
‘Multilatinas’ and more recently ‘Global Latinas’ (Casanova and Fraser 2009; Hatum and 
Michelini 2011), but most of them still have to find their way to Australia. ABS (2004b) 
shows that there were 39 Australia-owned affiliates in Brazil in 2002-03, 27 in Chile and 
25 in Mexico, that altogether employed 6,300 people, plus another 22 firms in other Latin 
American countries (Van Ruth 2008: 13). Given considerable FDI inflows in Latin 
America’s booming mining sector, it is likely that the number of Australian firms in the 
continent increased significantly in recent years.  
Table 7 shows company acquisitions between Australia and Latin America. The 
most prominent acquisition in Latin America was Nufarm’s purchase of Agripec in Brazil 
in 2007. Of greater significance was the acquisition of the Rinker group in Australia by 
Cemex of Mexico, and of coal-mining company AMCI Holdings by Brazil’s iron ore-
mining Vale in 2007. Brazil’s JBS Friboi group gained control over meat packer 
Australia Meat Holdings, when it acquired its US parent firm Swift in 2007. Re-named 
Swift Australia, this JBS subsidiary purchased the Tatiara Meat Company in 2010. 
Table 7 reveals that mining, mining services and utilities companies dominate the 
interests of Australian companies in Latin America. Several interests of Australian 
mining companies are not included for reasons explained below. For example, BHP 
Billiton has a 100% interest in the Cerro Colorado copper mine in Chile, joint venture 
(JV) interests in refining plants and coal and nickel mining in Brazil and Colombia, as 
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well as in the Antemina copper and zinc mine in Peru. Several Australian mining supplies 
and service companies have followed in the wake of the mining companies. For example, 
Austin Engineering purchased Conymet in Chile in 2009 to produce dump truck bodies 
for mining ventures throughout South America. Several non-mining firms also found 
their way to Latin America. For example, Australia’s Pacific Hydro used its expertise in 
hydro and wind electricity to take advantage of privatisation in Chile’s energy sector to 
enter the market for hydro electricity investment in 2004, and to invest in wind electricity 
projects in Brazil. Packaging producer TNA established subsidiaries in Chile and Mexico. 
A number of Australian companies have also been attracted by the openness of the 
Chilean economy to choose it as their base in Latin America, such as the mining services 
and chemicals divisions of Orica.  
Table 7 does not give a comprehensive overview of investments between 
Australia and Latin America for four reasons. (1) The value of deals is not always 
disclosed. For example, QBE’s acquisition of insurance firm Cumbre Seguros in Mexico 
and Ansell’s purchase of Blowtex in Brazil in 2007 are not included for that reason. (2) 
Systematic information on Greenfield investments is not readily available. For example, 
Agrichem’s establishment in 2000 of a fertiliser production and distribution JV in Brazil 
is not included, nor is Orica’s JV with Grupo Merand in Venezuela that operates two 
explosives plants. Many of the smaller interests of Australian firms are not included for 
the same reason, such as the Nufarm-owned subsidiary companies in 10 Latin American 
countries that distribute Nufarm’s products.  
(3) Several Australian construction, mining and mining services companies 
operate in Latin America on a project basis and have project-based subsidiaries or 
representative offices in Latin America. Australia-based mining companies also have 
ventures in Latin America that are in different stages of development. They may have 
concessions for exploration of mineral deposits, or are in the process of acquiring 
funding. Others are still awaiting permissions to start mining operations and/or are in the 
process of securing funding for that purpose on Australian or international capital 
markets. Or they are creating JV operations for that purpose. Brambles and Bovis Lend 
Lease have a presence in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico for the purpose of securing 
or carrying out construction projects. Engineering company Cullen Grummit and Roe has 
a presence in Argentina and Peru and conducts port development projects in different 
Latin American countries. Likewise, mining services companies Maptek and Mincom 
conduct IT projects in several places in Latin America.  
(4) Several Australian companies arranged acquisitions of firms through their 
foreign subsidiaries. For example, Amcor acquired a significant presence in 2003 through 
a US$115 million purchase of competitor Alcoa’s nine PET container production 
facilities in Latin America, but through its US subsidiary Amcor Holdings. The large 
mining companies conduct operations in this way. For example, BHP Billiton invested in 
Chile via one of its US subsidiaries (Van Ruth 2008: 13). Consequently, Australia’s large 
mining companies, particularly BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Xtrata, have established 
multiple operations in Latin America not shown in Table 7. Similarly, the purchase of 
Rinker was actually financed through the foreign operations of Cemex, not by its 
headquarters in Mexico (ECLAC 2007: 55). 
  
Table 7: Company Acquisitions between Australia and Latin America, 1997-2010      
Australian firm  Latin American firm Country  Year  Industry  Stake  Deal value 
(mln A$) 
By Australian firms in Latin America         
Nufarm Ltd  Agripec Quimica e Farmacêutica SA  Brazil 2004,  2007  Manufacturing 100%  389 
Pacific Hydro Ltd  Coya and Pangal hyrdoelectric plants  Chile  2003  Utilities  100%  120 
Pacific Hydro International Pty Ltd  Pacific Hydro Chile SA  Chile  2008  Utilities  >50%  118 
Superannuation funds consortium  GasValpo SA  Chile  2008  Utilities  100%  101 
SEEK Ltd  Brasil Online Holdings Coöperatief UA  Brazil  2008  ICT  30%  81 
Beadell Resources Ltd  Mineração Pedra Branca do Amapari Ltda  Brazil  2010  Mining  100%  68 
QBE Insurance Group Ltd  Reliance National Compania Argentina de Seguros SA  Argentina  2001  Insurance  >50%  47 
Strike Resources Ltd  Apurímac Ferrum SA  Peru  2008  Mining  51%  39 
AGL Ltd  GasValpo SA  Chile  2000 (1)  Utilities  100%  37 
Admiralty Resources NL  Compania Minera Santa Barbara SA  Chile  2005, 2008  Mining  60%  28 
QBE Insurance Group Ltd  Compañía Central de Seguros SA  Colombia  2005  Insurance  97%  26 
Austin Engineering Ltd  Conymet Ltda  Chile  2009  Mining services  100%  23 
BHP Billiton Ltd  Jaguar Nickel SA  Guatemala  2005  Mining  100%  22 
Voicenet (Aust) Ltd  Rimpex International SA  Chile  2000  ICT  100%  11 
Natasa Mining Ltd (2)  Puquios copper project  Chile  2007  Mining  92%  10 
Coffey International Ltd  Geoexplore Consultoria e Servicos Ltda  Brazil  2007  Mining services  100%  8 
SMC Gold Ltd  Compañía Minera Tamaya SA  Chile  2003  Mining  100%  8 
Orica Ltd  Andean Chemicals Group  Chile, Peru  2005  Manufacturing  51%  8 
Tiger Resources Ltd  Bom Jardim Creek Project  Brazil  2005  Mining  100%  7 
            
By Latin American firms in Australia         
Rinker Group Ltd  Cemex SAB de CV  Mexico  2007 (3)  Construction  100%  19,392 
AMCI Holdings Australia Pty Ltd  Companhia Vale do Rio Doce Ltda  Brazil  2007  Mining  100%  986 
Tatiara Meat Company Pty Ltd  JBS SA  Brazil  2010  Food processing  100%  35 
Rositas Investments Pty Ltd  Gruma SA de CV  Mexico  2006  Food processing  100%  18 
Notes: Only deals with a disclosed value over A$6 million. Total deal value may vary from announcements, due to exchange rate differences between deal announce-
ments and conclusions denominated in US$. (1) Divested in 2008. (2) Previously Investika Ltd. (3) Divested in 2009. 
Sources: Bureau van Dijk, Zephyr database, May 2010; company public announcements. 
  8For those reasons, Tables 6 and 7 only give a partial impression of the 
investments relations between Australia and Latin America. On the other hand, 
Australian firms are altogether not major investors in Latin America. For example, at the 
end of 2008 FDI from Australia was only 3% of the total stock of FDI in Chile (INE 
2009), and just 2% of the stock of FDI in Brazil (BCB 2010).  
This section has shown that Australia’s business relations with Latin America are 
focused on Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Trade relations have diversified towards 
manufactured products and services. Goods trade has grown faster than Australia’s trade 
with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, Australia’s business relations with Latin 
America remain of lesser significance compared with those with other parts of the world, 
and  vice versa. This impression is confirmed by the three recent surveys among 
Australian companies by Australia’s Export Finance Insurance Corporation (EFIC). They 
consistently rate Central and South America last among all continents in the world 
(including Africa) in terms of foreign revenues (14% in 2008), export destinations (12% 
in 2009, 10% in 2010), expected future export destinations (14% in 2009 and 2010), off-
shore operations (9% in 2008, 6% in 2009, 4% in 2010, particularly mining companies), 
and expected future off-shore operations (6% in 2008, 10% in 2009, 7% in 2010) (EFIC 
2008: 16, 24, 30; EFIC 2009: 18, 24, 30, 46; EFIC 2010: 28, 32, 42, 52). Consequently, 
there are still ample opportunities for a further expansion of business relations. Before 
analysing how this may be fostered, this paper probes factors that help to explain why 
Australian interest in business relations with Latin America is still retrained. 
 
3. Business environments: How important are the remaining differences? 
 
Distance across the Pacific Ocean is sometimes identified as a major impediment to 
Australia’s business relations with Latin America. For example, a 2001 DFAT report 
noted that the long distance between Australia and Latin America increases the share of 
transport costs, especially for Australia’s low-value bulk export commodities (DFAT 
2001: 20-21). However, long physical distances are not necessarily an impediment if 
efficient transport connections (shipping and air transport) for goods and people exist. An 
amalgam of other notions, such as ‘economic’, ‘institutional’ and ‘psychic’ distance, 
rather than simply geographic distance, may explain the degree business contacts. 
Economic distance relates to differences in the economic situation between 
Australia and the countries of Latin America. Table 8 shows that Australia is small in 
terms of population, but its GDP per capita and therefore its standard of living is high 
relative to the main countries of Latin America. Australia’s GDP is therefore relatively 
large. The degree to which the Australian economy depends on foreign trade is broadly 
comparable to Latin America as a whole, which of course implies that trade per capita is 
considerably higher than in Latin America. 
  The level of GDP per capita is an indicator of the maturity of markets for 
advanced goods and services. Market size matters to business relations, but so does a 
range of other aspects of the business environment, such as economic stability. During 
the past 20 years, major countries in Latin America have experienced significant macro-
economic crises, particularly Mexico in 1982, 1990 and 1994-95, Brazil in 1994-95 and 
Argentina in 2002-03. Drastic exchange rate fluctuations enhanced the risk of doing 
  9business with these countries. Memories of such episodes of economic crisis may be 
fading, but they are likely to feed lingering general impressions of economic instability.  
Other factors shape perceptions of economic distance. Exchange rate stability may 
be less relevant in trade relations, as international transactions are generally denominated 
in stable international currencies, and firms hedge adverse exchange rate movements. 
More important is the likelihood that foreign business partners will pay for deliveries, or 
will deliver goods upon receipt of payment, for which the letter of credit and bill of 
exchange mechanism is sufficient. For transactions with customers in high-risk countries, 
companies may secure the services of government-sponsored agencies that offer export 
credit insurance. In Australia, EFIC uses the country risk classifications of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for its insurance 
activities. Table 9 shows that Australia is among the low-risk countries. Most Latin 
American countries are in the medium (Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica) to high risk 
(Argentina and Ecuador) categories. Some countries have reduced their risk ranking; 
particularly Mexico and Brazil (see Section 4).  
 
 
















Australia  21.4  1,015.2 47,498 18,699  46 
         
Brazil  192.0 1,612.5 8,400 1,854  26 
Mexico 106.4  1,886.0  17,733  5,643  58 
Colombia  44.5  242.3 5,440 1,648  36 
Argentina  39.9  328.4 8,235 3,070  45 
Peru  28.8  127.4 4,419 1,968  52 
Chile 16.8  169.5  10,112  7,766  81 
Guatemala  13.7  39.0 2,850 1,707  66 
Ecuador  13.5  52.6 3,900 2,507  72 
Dominican  Rep  9.8  45.8 4,654 2,798  66 
El  Salvador  6.1  22.1 3,605 2,529  76 
Costa  Rica  4.5  29.8 6,590 6,035  103 
Uruguay  3.3  32.2 9,654 4,468  58 
Jamaica  2.7  15.1 5,604 5,028  101 
Trinidad & Tobago   1.3  23.9  17,861  15,278  111 
Total,  average  483.3 4,626.5 9,572 3,135  47 
Note: The average trade-GDP ratio for Latin America is unweighted. 
Source: WTO Country Profiles, http://stat.wto.org/   
 
  
We can expect a positive correlation between the risk rating of these countries and 
the reluctance among Australian companies to export to or import from these countries. 
Firms can minimise transaction risks, for example by dealing exclusively with trusted 
business partners or purchasing export credit insurance from financial institutions or 
possibly EFIC, but such actions increase their transaction costs. The indicators are based 
on the payment experiences of OECD countries, as well as the financial and economic 
  10situation of assessed countries, but the OECD does not publish the details of its 
deliberations. McCoy and McLendon (2009) discuss factors that shape the business 
environment in 18 Latin American countries. These are also captured in composite 
indices that rank countries on the basis of various aspects of their business environment. 
Table 10 shows three of such composite indices and confirms that there are major 
differences between the business environments of Australia and Latin America. Those 
differences inform perceptions of risk that companies take into account when considering 
whether to take advantage of foreign business opportunities through trade and 
investment, or not. For example, research for Latin American countries found that greater 
economic freedom, as well as minimisation of expropriation risk, financial and trade 
reforms, good governance and institutional improvements are all positively correlated 
with greater inflows of FDI (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 2003; Treviño and Mixon 
2004; Biglaiser and De Rouen 2006). 
 
 
Table 9: OECD Country Risk Classifications, Australia and Latin America, 1999-2010 
 1999-02  2003-06  2007-10 
Australia 0.0  0.0  0.0 
      
Chile 2.0  2.0  2.0 
Trinidad and Tobago  2.4  2.0  2.0 
Mexico 3.4  2.6  2.2 
Costa Rica  3.5  3.0  3.0 
Brazil 5.9  5.4  3.2 
Peru 5.1  4.6  3.5 
El Salvador  4.0  4.0  4.0 
Colombia 4.9  5.3  4.0 
Uruguay 3.6  5.9  4.2 
Guatemala 6.0  5.9  5.0 
Paraguay 5.6  6.5  5.5 
Jamaica 5.0  5.9  6.0 
Honduras 6.9  7.0  6.2 
Venezuela 4.8  6.3  6.2 
Argentina 5.9  7.0  7.0 
Bolivia 6.6  7.0  7.0 
Ecuador 6.9  7.0  7.0 
Nicaragua 7.0  7.0  7.0 
Note: The classifications are for export credit risk assessment. The scale is from 0 (low 
risk) to 7 (high risk). The data shown are quarterly averages. 
Source: Calculated from OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/12/35483246.pdf 
 
  
  Most pertinent to firms engaged in international business are issues captured by 
the World Bank’s annual survey of the business environment around the world.
5 The 
summary in Table 11 shows that Australia is not the easiest country to conduct business 
                                                 
5 Brenes et al. (2009) offer a firm-level perspective of the importance of some of these impediments, while 
Donoso and Crittenden (2008) explain the ample opportunities for further research on the international 
competitiveness and strategic management of firms in Latin America.  
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in. However, compared with most countries in Latin America, it ranks on average highly. 
Hence, it is not just on the basis of the opinions of company executives and/or macro-
economic and financial indicators that Latin American countries can be regarded as 
difficult and risky countries for the purposes of international business. A range of micro-
economic, regulatory issues relevant to business operations points in the same direction. 
 
 








Country Risk Index 
2009 
Australia 14.0  82.6  85.8 
      
Chile 25.0  77.2  67.9 
Mexico 37.0  68.3  61.5 
Brazil 43.0  55.6  59.2 
Peru   67.6  56.0 
Colombia 44.0  65.5  53.6 
Trinidad and Tobago    65.7  53.2 
Costa Rica    65.9  52.6 
Uruguay   69.8  49.2 
Guatemala   61.0  47.8 
El Salvador    69.9  47.3 
Honduras   58.3  44.7 
Argentina 42.0  51.2  42.6 
Jamaica   65.5  42.0 
Venezuela 48.0  37.1  42.0 
Paraguay   61.3  40.2 
Bolivia   49.4  37.1 
Ecuador 42.0  49.3  33.1 
Nicaragua   58.3  32.8 
Note: The scales are from 0 (respectively low opacity, low economic freedom or high risk) to 100 
(respectively high opacity, high economic freedom or low risk).  
Sources: Kurtzman and Yago 2009; Miller and Holmes 2010; Euromoney (March 2009). 
 
 
Companies can overcome difficulties in foreign business environments. For 
example, with specific reference to Australian firms in Latin America, Van Ruth (2008) 
found that person-to-person contact and the creation of networks based on such personal 
contacts can help overcome the difficulties that underlie the ‘psychic distance’ between 
Australia and Latin America. Networks mitigated risk and expedited the 
internationalisation of Australian firms in Latin America by providing access to business 
information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain, e.g. in finding employees, agents 
or local partners, providing access to customers and suppliers, as well as reassurance and 
credibility, and an opportunity to share experiences and learn from them. Arguably, 
networks are particularly relevant to the business environment in Latin American 
countries, given the opacity and the uncertainties caused by weak formal institutions in 
most of them, but also because of a culturally ingrained penchant for personal 
relationships that is much stronger than in Australia (Osland et al. 2008: 111).  
Table 11: Australia and Latin American Countries in Global Ranking of 183 Countries by Ease of Doing Business, 2010       




















Australia  9 3  62  1  34  4 57 47 16 14 
                 
Puerto  Rico  35  15  149  22 124  30 16  104 97 30 
Colombia  37 74  32  63  51  61  5 115 152  32 
Chile  49  69  67  72  42  71 41 45 69  114 
Mexico  51  90  37  136  99  61 41  106 81 24 
Peru  56  112  117  112  28  15 20 86  114 99 
Jamaica  75 19  49  39  122  87  73 174 128  23 
Trinidad & Tobago  81  65  82  45  170  30  20  56  169  183 
El  Salvador  84  121  128  106  46  43 119 134  50  81 
Guatemala  110  156  150  127  24  4 132 108 103  93 
Uruguay  114  132  140  64 165  43 93  159 96 46 
Nicaragua  117  95  137  84 143  87 93  165 67 70 
Argentina  118  138  168  101  115  61 109 142  46  86 
Costa  Rica  121  127  128  110  49  61 165 154 132 101 
Paraguay  124  100  106  179  79  71  57 110 104 119 
Brazil  129  126  113  138  120  87  73 150 100 131 
Ecuador  138  163  86  160  69  87 132  77 101 134 
Honduras  141  144  74  168  91  30 165 145 175 118 
Bolivia  161  167  101  183  135  113 132 177 136  62 
Venezuela  177  142  94  181  97  177 178 182  74 151 
Source: World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings         
 
 
  13  Effective networks are the result of companies pursuing a long-term strategy of 
building them by investing time and effort in the long accumulative process of 
establishing and maintaining personal and business relations. Spanish may still be a 
difficult language for many Australian business people. English is likely to be a second 
language for business people in Latin America, but speaking the same language does not 
necessarily mean that people entirely understand each other’s intentions, as arguably over 
90% of interpersonal communication tends to be of a non-verbal nature (Mehrabian 
1981). If so, cultural differences may impact on the perceived ‘distance’ between the 
business environments of Australia and Latin American countries as a barrier to business 
contacts.  
  The cultural differences between Australia and Latin America are substantial. For 
example, Australia scores 90 on Hofstede’s ‘Individualism Index’, while the average 
score for 14 Latin American countries is 22 (Hofstede 1997: 26, 53, 84, 113). This 
indicates that Latin American individuals are inclined to establish strong, cohesive in-
groups based on personal relationships, while in Australia ties between individuals tend 
to be loose. Australia scores 51 on the ‘Uncertainty Avoidance Index’ and the average for 
Latin America is 80. This indicates that Australians are more tolerant of the uncertainty 
and ambiguity of new situations and experiences, while in Latin American countries 
people prefer to avoid uncertainty. There are therefore major differences in the norms and 
values of Australians and people in Latin America, which could be a source of 
miscommunication at an interpersonal level. Nevertheless, only 15% of all Australian 
companies identified cultural differences as a major barrier to international expansion, the 
lowest of all perceived barriers (EFIC 2008: 42 and 52). A further 57% regarded cultural 
differences to be a minor barrier. 
  Awareness of the relevance of cultural differences tends to be a personal 
experience, which only comes with sustained immersion in a different culture. Large 
companies may be able to help key managers to develop ways to overcome cultural 
differences, but small-and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) do not, notwithstanding the 
increasing ease of communications by internet across the globe. In Australia, particularly 
SMEs face a steep learning curve when they seek to engage in international business. 
Consequently, only 10% of Australian SMEs engages in exporting (Sensis 2010: 17), 
lower than in other countries (Austrade 2002: 9).  
  The perception of physical distance across the Pacific Ocean is enhanced by 
cumbersome communications. Telephone and internet connections may now be well 
developed, but there are still limited direct shipping connections between Australian ports 
and ports in Latin America. For example 0.9% of the value of outward freight loaded in 
Australian ports is destined for South America, and 0.8% of freight unloaded in 
Australian ports originated from South America (BITRE 2008: 8 and 11), which is lower 
than the share of Latin America as a whole in the value of trade. Most of this cargo is 
transhipped in containers via other ports. For example, shipping company Maersk ships 
containers between Australia and Latin America via Mazarillo and Balboa in Panama and 
Cartagena in Colombia, while Evergreen ships them via ports in Asia, such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore to the East Coast, and via Colon in Panama to the West Coast of 
Latin America. Facilities in container ports may be efficient, but transhipments add costs 
and increase delays in deliveries.  
  The considerable challenges in Latin America’s business environment did not 
deter all Australian firms. Business relations have grown, but they are largely the result of 
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risk. Potter (2009) discussed the difficulties that Australian firms, such as RYCO 
Hydraulics, had to overcome in Brazil before their ventures succeeded. On the other 
hand, there are examples of firms whose ventures in Latin America did not live up to 
expectations. For example, Village Roadshow created in 1994 a subsidiary venture to 
establish and manage cinemas in Argentina, which it divested in 2005 when the venture 
became unprofitable. Likewise, AGL took in 2000 a controlling share in GasValpo in 
Chile, a gas distributor, which it divested in 2008.  
  Australian government agencies assist firms in overcoming the risks that firms 
perceive when considering business relations with Latin America. Three-quarters (76%) 
of Australian firms identified their lack of local business and market knowledge in 
foreign countries as an impediment to engagement in international business (EFIC 2008: 
53). About a third (32%) had used the services of Austrade to overcome this impediment, 
and 15% had consulted EFIC (EFIC 2009: 66). EFIC’s expertise with Latin America 
appears limited. For example, it does not issue any profiles on the countries of that global 
region, but refers potential customers to the OECD country risk grades mentioned above. 
EFIC’s annual reports indicate that the share of South America in the agency’s total 
exposure increased from 0.4% in mid-2006 and 2007 to 2.8% in mid-2008 and 2009. 
Although still marginal, firms have increased their appeals to EFIC for support of their 
undertakings in Latin America. 
  This section showed that there are important differences between the business 
environments of Australia and the countries of Latin America. They may have deterred 
many companies, but not all. Particularly Australia-based mining companies have 
established business relations in Latin America, possibly in response to the doubling of 
metals and energy prices on global markets since 2004 (IMF 2010) that increased the 
incentives for firms to overcome the difficulties of doing business in Latin America, and 
absorb the cost of minimising risk. Outside the mining sector, there are fewer examples 
of Australian firms investing in Latin America, while there are few examples of Latin 
American companies that invested in Australia. Hence, the differences in the business 
environments of Australia and Latin America most likely still deter business relations.  
 
4. Shared experiences in structural reform and trade liberalisation 
 
Prior to the 1980s, Australia and Latin America regarded each other primarily as trade 
competitors rather than trade partners. Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Colombia were, like 
Australia, competitive exporters of the same temperate and sub-tropical agricultural 
products (such as beef, grains, sugar, fruit and fruit products) and minerals (especially 
iron ore in Brazil) to Northern hemisphere markets. Nevertheless, they shared interests in 
defending their agricultural trade against the protectionist agricultural policies of the 
European Community (EC) and the United States of America (USA) as exporting 
members of international commodity agreements and through the dispute settlement 
provisions of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) (Kenyon and Lee 
2006: 25-27, 45-49).   Beyond  agriculture,  Australia and Latin American countries 
followed essentially inward looking industry policies through import substitution, high 
tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers to manufactured imports, managed exchange rates and 
foreign exchange controls, and a relatively high level of government involvement and 
management of the economy. Such policy stances hindered broader business links 
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pursued different priorities regarding regional economic integration. Australia’s priorities 
were oriented towards newly emerging markets in East Asia, as well as the US, and 
focused exports of agricultural and mining sectors. During the 1960s and 1970s, Latin 
American countries, fostered regional economic integration, but their inward-looking 
trade and industry policies made effective cooperation difficult.  
  By the early 1980s, the successive shocks caused by oil price hikes, ‘stagflation’ 
in Western Europe and North America, and the emergence of an industrially more 
competitive Japan created a new situation that called on countries to consider ways to 
increase the global competitiveness of their enterprises. Tariff protection and economic 
systems with a high degree of government intervention gave way to open trade policies, 
de-regulated industries and floating exchange rates. In Australia, a period of fundamental 
change in economic and trade policy started in the early-1980s that saw the deregulation 
of currency and exchange controls and the floating of the Australian dollar, the 
dismantling of the protective system of high industrial tariffs, de-regulation and 
privatisation of many previously government controlled and owned industries, followed 
by regulatory reforms of the financial sector and the lifting of restrictions on foreign 
investment (Kenyon and Lee 2006: 52-53) In all, by the early 1990s, Australia had a 
more integrated and internationally competitive financial sector, as well as a reduced role 
of government in the management of the economy. During the 1990s Australia’s 
economy became more open and internationally competitive.  
  Similar changes took hold in key Latin American countries, albeit that financial 
crises in some countries resulted in a ‘two steps forwards, one backwards’ approach. In 
Mexico, the external debt crisis of 1982 gave rise to a programme of wide-ranging 
economic reforms. Mexico joined GATT in 1986, marking the start of a process of 
reducing tariff protection as well as programmes of privatisation and regulatory reform. 
Financial crises in 1990 and 1994 halted the process temporarily, but the entry into force 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the USA in 
1994 provided a new momentum of trade liberalisation and Mexico’s integration in 
global markets.  
  In Brazil, the process of integration into global markets started in earnestness in 
1994, after years of debilitating high inflation. That year, Brazil stabilised the currency 
exchange rate relative to the US dollar to address inflation problems. This was supported 
by a vigorous programme of privatisation and de-regulation that opened up the economy 
to market-based principles during the 1990s. The changes were not without difficulties. 
Nevertheless, prudent economic management secured economic stability and economic 
growth followed. 
  In the early-1990s, Argentina took similar measures to Brazil to resolve the 
problem of high inflation. It too suffered the consequences of an economy with a heavy 
predominance on government management. In 1991 it pegged its currency to the US 
dollar and imposed fiscal discipline. Processes of privatisation and deregulation, as well 
as reducing barriers to foreign trade and investment facilitated economic recovery and 
growth. This was interrupted in 2002, when the US dollar peg became unsustainable. 
Further policy action such as abandoning full convertibility with the US dollar stabilised 
the currency a year later, and marked a new process of recovery and growth.  
  In Chile, economic reforms already started in the mid-1970s, when it lifted 
barriers to trade and investment and embarked on a process of privatisation and financial 
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the 1980s and 1990s, sustained by Chile’s increasing engagement in global markets. 
Chile’s foreign trade indeed expanded rapidly following the global deregulation of trade 
barriers since the late-1980s. 
  These Latin American countries embarked on processes of deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation of trade and investment policies for their own reasons and 
with their own institutional legacies. There were differences between each of them, as 
well as with other Latin American countries.
6 Hence, their experiences cannot be readily 
extrapolated to other countries in the region. For example, countries like Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Peru did not experience such changes, while in other countries such as 
Colombia similar changes started more recently.  
The point is that these four countries and Australia since the 1970s underwent 
similar processes of economic change that resulted in increasing engagement with global 
markets. At the same time, global trade of goods and services, as well as investment 
flows increased rapidly during the 1990s and 2000s, to a much greater degree than had 
ever occurred before (WTO 2009: 173; UNCTAD 2009: 4). This growth was sustained 
by a global adherence to trade liberalisation following the end of communism in Eastern 
Europe around 1990, the successful conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-93), 
and continued efforts to reduce trade barriers multilaterally, particularly for services, 
under the WTO mandate. Hence, during the last 20 years these countries enhanced their 
ability to participate in international business, and draw benefits from it. 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round gave a new impetus to the business 
relations between Australia and Latin America. The GATT negotiations had to deal with 
the challenge posed by the agricultural policies of the EC, the US, Japan and South Korea 
to the major trade interests of Australia and Latin American countries. The war of 
agricultural export subsidies between the EC and the USA took world agricultural trade 
to a crisis point by the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Australia brought 14 
developed and developing countries together in the Cairns Group (CG) of agricultural 
exporting countries, including five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Uruguay).
7 The success of the CG, and the cooperation experience 
dispelled much of the reticence that had previously marked relations between Australia 
and Latin American countries.  
Hence, by the mid-1990s, the prospects for future partnership between Australia 
and Latin America had been transformed. In addition, the implementation of economic 
and trade reform policies put Australia and key Latin American countries on more 
comparable paths of economic and trade openness. It obliged industries in these countries 
to re-adjust according to their comparative advantage, thus creating opportunities for 
closer business relations, as Section 2 outlined. Nevertheless, while the competitiveness 
of Australia and the four key Latin American countries and their engagement in 
international business increased, a range of issues remain. They range from the issues that 
shape the business environment in these countries (Section 3), to broader issues such as 
labour market rigidities and the considerable and tenacious problem of income inequality 
and poverty. In addition, processes of deregulation are still incomplete in several sectors, 
                                                 
6 Nevertheless these policy changes affected Latin America to a significant extent and were hailed as Latin 
America’s ‘New Economic Model’ that fostered FDI inflows during the 1990s (see e.g. Mortimore 2000).  
7 After the end of the Uruguay Round, 5 other Latin American countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Paraguay and Peru), plus Pakistan and South Africa joined the CG. 
  17in some Latin American countries more than others (e.g. Walton 2004). For example, 
Chile’s business environment is for that reason more comparable to that of Australia than 
that of other countries. Such resulting regulatory divergences continue to impose 
impediments to goods and services trade across the Pacific.  
  
5. A new partnership: Multilateral, regional and bilateral 
 
The continued diversity of business environments in Australia and Latin America makes 
it necessary for these countries to pursue a range of different, but interrelated multilateral, 
plurilateral and bilateral options in an effort to broaden and deepen their business 
relationships. Table 12 shows that Australia and key Latin American countries share only 
two fora that could be the basis for multi-country discussions on common interests in 
advancing their business relations: WTO and UNCTAD.  
 
  
Table 12: Membership of International Organisations and Regional Trade Agreements Relevant to 
Australia-Latin America Business Relations, February 2010 
 International    Regional 
   WTO  UNCTAD  APEC     LAIA  Mercosur  CACM  CAFTA  NAFTA 
Australia                  
USA                  
                  
Argentina                
Bolivia                 
Brazil                
Chile                  
Colombia                 
Costa Rica                 
Cuba                 
Dominican Rep.                 
Ecuador                 
El Salvador                 
Guatemala                 
Honduras                 
Mexico                  
Nicaragua                 
Paraguay                
Peru                  
Uruguay                
Venezuela                 
Notes: WTO = World Trade Organization; UNCTAD = United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development; APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; LAIA = Latin American Integration 
Association; Mercosur = Mercado Común del Sur [Southern Common Market]; CACM = Central 
American Common Market, CAFTA = Central American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA = North 
American Free Trade Agreement.  
Sources: WTO, RTA Data Base, http://rtais.wto.org; UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org  
 
 
UNCTAD is effectively a forum that allows less-developed countries to draw 
attention to their concerns about international trade and investment issues, and develop 
  18solutions in cooperation with developed countries. It is not a forum in which multi-
country coalitions generate leverage to advance global trade liberalisation. Nor does 
UNCTAD provide a forum for trade negotiations or constitute a body of trade rules in the 
way that WTO does. Table 12 also shows that several Latin American countries 
participate in regional trade agreements. Non-participation of Australia makes it difficult 
to see them as vehicles to advance common interests. That leaves WTO as the major 
international forum in which Australia and countries of Latin America can cooperate for 




The recent difficulties of bringing the eight-year old WTO Doha round of trade 
negotiations to a successful conclusion have detracted from the other ways in which 
WTO delivers trade liberalisation and cooperation, and maintains an open world trading 
system from which all member countries benefit. The GATT/WTO system constitutes a 
body of international trade law that applies to its members, covering trade in goods and 
services, and intellectual property rights. It also includes a dispute settlement system to 
ensure adherence by member countries to the trade rules.  
The conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round bolstered this system, and it 
effectively ended the ‘North-South’ or developed-less-developed country divide. 
Australia and all Latin American countries participated actively in pragmatic coalitions of 
developed and less-developed countries that worked to achieve outcomes on a subject-by-
subject or issue-by-issue basis. The stand-out example was the CG, but there were other 
‘North-South’ coalitions (Preeg 1995: 3-6, 58-62). This practice was developed further 
during the Doha round, so that for example the CG continues to play an active role, now 
with 10 Latin American member countries. 
Australia has worked in coalition groupings with some combination of Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico or Chile in several areas of negotiations on rules and services issues. 
Examples are fisheries subsidies, the ‘Colorado group’ on trade facilitation issues, the 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications for architects and engineers, computer 
related services, logistics and maritime transport (Diego-Fernández 2008: 450). Australia 
and Latin American countries have shared interests in specific dispute settlement cases in 
WTO. Such cases provide opportunities to foster trade policy and business links further. 
Stand-out examples are the ‘Byrd Amendment’ case (2001) brought by Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, and others including the EU against an item of US anti-dumping legislation, and 
the ‘Sugar Export Subsidy’ case against the EU that was brought to WTO jointly by 
Australia, Brazil and Thailand (Diego-Fernández 2008: 442). The WTO dispute 
settlement system is an effective mechanism for enforcing adherence to the trade rules, 
and through its judgments it also makes major contributions to trade liberalisation. 
  A third way in which WTO contributes to trade liberalisation is through the 
accession negotiating process. The 58 countries that acceded to WTO since 1994 were 
each required to negotiate their accession terms. These reflect not only the collectivity of 
commitments made by existing members. They frequently seek to extract concessions 
that go beyond existing multilateral commitments, thereby foreshadowing trade 
liberalising objectives of future rounds of negotiations. Thus, for accessions since the 
1994 establishment of WTO, its members have sought and secured ‘WTO plus’ trade 
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process also contributes to trade liberalisation. 
  WTO provides a valuable forum for trade policy cooperation between Australia 
and Latin American countries that could foster business links. Joint actions in pursuit of 
shared trade liberalisation objectives bring the respective trade policy objectives closer 
together. Joint action in dispute settlement cases and accession negotiations dealing with 
shared trade problems strengthens habits of working together. The more Australia and 
Latin American countries work together in WTO, the more likely it is that they find 
common cause in a future post-Doha agenda for WTO. This may be especially relevant 
with regard to dealing with the ‘behind the border’ barriers to trade such as product 




Since the 1980s, Latin American countries concluded regional and extra-regional 
agreements with major trading partners of the Northern hemisphere, with Mexico and 
Chile leading the way. Mexico concluded the NAFTA agreement with the USA and 
Canada (1994), followed by the Mexico-EU (2000) and a Mexico-EFTA (2001) 
agreements. FTAs now cover over 90% of Mexico’s total trade (JEG 2009: 31). Chile 
concluded agreements with the EU (2002), the USA (2004) and EFTA (2004). Chile 
accumulated no less than 54 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), including Australia (2009).  
Most agreements are ‘new generation’ FTAs that aim to be ‘WTO plus’. They 
satisfy the tariff liberalisation requirements of GATT article XXIV, but go beyond the 
Uruguay Round commitments in the new WTO areas of services trade liberalisation and 
intellectual property protection. They also achieve new, more liberal commitments in 
domestic regulatory policies that impact on trade and investment flows, such as product 
standards, domestic services regulations, public procurement policies, investment 
restrictions, and protection and business visas.
8 These new FTAs therefore demonstrate a 
readiness among Latin American countries to go beyond tariff liberalisation. In addition, 
participation in such FTAs underlines recognition that future outcomes may be best 
pursued by negotiating directly on the domestic regulations that hinder trade and 
investment flows, rather than a continued focus on border measures such as ‘market 
access’ and ‘national treatment’ commitments in the case of services under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Marconini 2006). 
The G20 group may strengthen Australia’s business relations with Latin America. 
It was established in 1999 with the aim of stabilising global financial markets and its role 
increased during the recent global financial crisis. The recent G20 summits emerged as 
the principal forum for global economic cooperation. Current G20 members account for 
over 85% of global GDP and 80% of global trade. Australia, Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico are members. At summits in 2008 and 2009, G20 leaders have pledged, inter 
alia, to develop programmes for strong, sustainable balanced growth subject to peer 
review, refrain from protectionist trade measures, and seek a conclusion to the Doha 
negotiations. Summits in 2010 emphasised strategies for recovery from the global 
financial crisis, reform of international financial regulatory system and reform of the 
                                                 
8 Marconini (2006) and Sauvé (2006) analysed for services and investment whether these ‘new generation’ 
FTAs between Latin American countries are indeed ‘WTO plus’ or possibly ‘WTO minus’. 
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Latin American members on economic growth and financial stability objectives in an 
open trade environment, which is likely to strengthen business links. 
  The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is a plurilateral grouping 
which can make important contributions to building closer trade and investment links 
with Latin America. As Table 13 shows, Australia, Chile, Mexico and Peru are members. 
APEC is focused on trade integration and has already made contributions over the past 
two decades to the liberalisation of physical trade barriers in the APEC region. APEC 
members are now increasingly focused on reducing regulatory barriers to trade especially 
in relation to competition policy, customs procedures, the mutual recognition of standards 
and reducing trade barriers imposed by domestic regulations on services.  
  Australia is interested in the development of an overarching ‘Free Trade Area of 
the Asia-Pacific’ (FTAAP). This may include all APEC member economies and will 
require a lengthy period of preparatory work. While the FTAAP initiative had some 
resonance in APEC member countries Chile, Mexico and Peru, it remains to be seen 
whether the governments of these countries will be interested in participating in such an 
overarching FTA. In that context, plans have been underway since 2008 for a Trans 
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) that brought together 9 countries, including 
Australia, Chile, Peru and the US. TPP is another important initiative strengthening links 
across the Pacific. Participants are expected to aim for a ‘WTO plus’ plurilateral 
agreement that increases economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP could 
be a step towards multilateralising or at least regionalising existing FTAs between TPP 
partners. Alternatively, existing FTAs could continue to exist alongside the TPP. Either 
way, the TPP agreement ‘represents a pathway towards achieving APEC’s long term goal 




Bilateral FTAs can have a discriminatory impact on trading partners that are not parties to 
bilateral preferential agreements. For example, Mexico’s engagement in NAFTA favours 
trade with the USA and Canada, and implicitly discriminates against Australia. This 
makes Australia’s bilateral relationship with Mexico more complex than with other Latin 
American partners. Mexico’s focus on extracting maximum benefits from NAFTA and its 
growing concern with competition from China in the US market, complicate its relations 
with Australia. A ‘Joint Expert Group’ (JEG) established under the Australia-Mexico 
Trade and Investment Agreement (1994) recently identified scope for ‘increased 
economic cooperation’ and ‘an enhanced trade policy dialogue’ (JEG 2009: 47).  
Australia’s major business interests in Mexico centre on exports of minerals and 
investment in mining, as well as agriculture and agri-business services. It has an interest 
in eliminating Mexico’s discriminatory import tariffs against e.g. Australian beef. 
Mexico’s major interests in Australia are in attracting more FDI in mining and relief from 
Australia’s phyto-sanitary barriers against Mexico’s horticultural exports. The bilateral 
business relationship continues to be hampered by a mutual lack of awareness of trade 
and investment potential, poor air and sea transport links, as well as a variety of 
regulatory problems, including customs procedures, standards, services regulations and 
public procurement policies. Table 13 shows that Australia and Mexico already have 
trade-related bilateral agreements. In future, several bilateral initiatives might be taken to 
  21enhance the business relationship. For example, renegotiation of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Mining, opening dialogues on reducing regulatory barriers to 
cross-border trade in services, and on options for regulatory cooperation more generally, 
which may encompass recognition of professional qualifications, customs procedures, 




Table 13: Business-Related Bilateral Agreements between Australia and Latin American Countries 
  
Argen





Free  trade  agreement  - -  2009  - - - - 
Air  services  agreement  1992  2010  2001  2005 - - - 
Investment protection agreement  1997  -  1999  2007  -  1997  2001* 
Double  taxation  agreement  2000 -  2010*  2004 - - - 
MoU  on  education  and  training  2001 2005 2004  2008 2002 2006  - 
MoU on scientific and technological cooperation  2003  2001  -  2004  -  -  - 
MoU  on  sanitary  matters  -  1998 -  - - - - 
MoU  on  development  of  rail  infrastructure  yes - -  - - - - 
MoU  on  energy  cooperation  - - -  2005 - - - 
MoU  on  mining  cooperation  - -  2006  2002° - - - 
Notes: * = not yet in force. ° = expired in 2007. Years indicate when the agreement came into force, or when the 
memorandum was signed. 
Sources: United Nations Treaty Series http://treaties.un.org; DFAT Annual Reports (1993/94-2009/10); 
Department of Infrastructure (Australia) http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/international/agreements.aspx; 
Treasury Department (Australia) http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=625; Sistema de 
Información sobre Comercio Exterior (SICE, Organization of American States) http://www.sice.oas.org. 
 
Chile’s economy is now the most open in Latin America. Despite its extensive 
network of FTAs, Chile is a strong supporter of WTO. It is also a participant in APEC 
and in the TPP negotiations. Several Australian companies have chosen Chile as a base 
for their Latin American operations. The development of Australia’s business relationship 
with Chile will be largely determined by the 2009 Australia-Chile FTA, and possibly how 
the TPP-FTA negotiations unfold. Table 13 shows that further trade-related bilateral 
agreements are in place, but there are areas where Australia and Chile might build on the 
provisions of the FTA. This could include action on mutual recognition of standards 
beyond the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or possibly mutual 
recognition agreements on professional qualifications.  
Like Australia, Brazil has a broadly based export profile with North Asia, 
especially China, North America and Europe. This comparable profile opens up 
opportunities for increased trade and investment in mining, mining technology and agri-
business, as well as professional, business, consultancy and financial services. Unlike 
Mexico, access to the Brazilian market is not compromised by the existence of 
preferential FTAs with Northern hemisphere partners.  
Brazil is a member of the 1991 Mercosur customs union with Argentina, Paraguay 
and Uruguay and in tariff terms, Australia needs to deal with Mercosur as a single entity. 
Mercosur has not yet attempted to deal with non-tariff barriers to trade, which continue to 
be an obstacle to Australia’s business relationship with Brazil. Hence, the many ‘behind 
the border’ non-tariff barriers and domestic regulations, such as investment restrictions, 
  22competition policy issues, tax measures, and issues related to public procurement and 
product standards, could be addressed through bilateral dialogue. Table 13 shows the 
relevant bilateral agreements between Australia and Brazil. An agreement for science and 
technology cooperation is being negotiated and there may be scope for the negotiation of 
a ‘Trade and Investment Facilitation Agreement’. Both countries also concluded an 
agreement in 2008 to establish a ‘Plan of Action to Achieve an Enhanced Partnership’. A 
way forward in fostering Australia-Brazil business relations would be a focused dialogue 
on regulatory obstacles in relation to trade and investment. Perhaps this could be 
achieved through both the ‘Enhanced Partnership’ action plan, or by revitalising the 
moribund 1996 ‘Mercosur-CER Dialogue’ to strengthen cooperation on issues of global 
trade. The latter could have the advantage of Australia and New Zealand engaging Brazil 
at the sub-WTO level in dealing with international trade issues.  
Argentina would be included in the ‘Mercosur-CER Dialogue’. Australia and 
Argentina share interests as exporters of meat and grains, and have a shared experience in 
defending the interests of efficient agricultural exporters against protectionist policies of 
major Northern hemisphere countries. Table 13 shows that both concluded several 
agreements that support bilateral business relations. They also have common trade and 
investment interests in mining and mining technology, and services. Argentina’s fragile 
economic recovery from the 2002-03 financial crisis is a major obstacle. For example, its 
balance of payments problems required import restrictions through licensing, which 
depressed its imports from Australia.  
Colombia and Peru have the capacity to become more important trading partners 
for Australia. Both are following Chile’s path of economic reform and trade openness. 
Australia recently concluded a MoU with Colombia aimed at strengthening trade and 
investment links. Australia’s mining interests in Peru are growing and an Australia-Peru 
air services agreement is under negotiation. Colombia is interested in becoming an APEC 
member, and both countries are interested in engaging more with the Western Pacific in 




The scope for closer business relations between Australia and Latin America has been 
slow to materialise, but rather than strangers they are now partners in the hemisphere. Up 
to the early 1980s, they thought of each other primarily as competitive exporters of 
agricultural and mining products, rather than as close business partners. Since then, 
global economic challenges caused the implementation of programmes of domestic 
economic reform and trade liberalisation. The economies of Australia and key Latin 
American countries became more open to international competition and trade, creating 
new opportunities for trade and investment flows across the Pacific. 
Nevertheless, the Australian trade relations with Latin America still account for 
just 2% or less. Section 3 explained that major differences in business environments 
remain, while Section 4 explained that progress in the economic reform programmes of 
some key Latin American have been interrupted by periodic financial crises. Differences 
in per-capita GDP, continuing market rigidities and – in some cases – international 
payment restrictions are factors that sustain perceptions of ‘distance’ between Australia 
and its major Latin American partners. Latin American countries generally still have less 
favourable rankings than Australia in rankings that reflect the perceptions in the business 
  23world of the continent. Sustained efforts will be needed to address these hurdles which in 
part relate to the incompleteness of economic reform and trade liberalisation 
programmes.  
Section 2 showed that business relations between Australia and Latin America are 
changing. Of special interest is the growth in operations of the large multinational mining 
companies. But other Australian companies are also showing increasing interest in Latin 
America. Section 5 elaborated that interest at an inter-governmental level in fostering 
closer trade relations is also growing. For example, the 2009 Australia-Chile FTA 
provides strong evidence of a commitment on both sides to deepening the economic 
relationship beyond tariff liberalisation to domestic regulatory cooperation.  
Plurilateral opportunities for deepening business relations across the Pacific also 
exist. The TPP negotiations could bring Chile and Peru together with Australia and others 
into what could be a ‘WTO plus’ regional FTA. In addition, APEC will increasingly 
provide opportunities for closer dialogue between Australia and the member Latin 
American countries. WTO provides an opportunity for cooperation in the pursuit of 
shared multilateral trade liberalisation goals. Close Australian-Latin American 
cooperation continued in the Doha round, not only on agriculture, but several other 
issues. WTO provides opportunities for Australia and Latin American countries to work 
together on common interests relating to accession negotiations, dispute settlement cases 
and in helping to set the agenda for future trade negotiating rounds. In all, these 
developments enhance the opportunities and incentives for the further growth of 
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